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The idyllic view of nature is false: natural processes, given the prevalence of the reproductive 
strategy known as “r-selection”, tend to maximize the suffering of animals in nature. For the 
animals subjected to natural processes, disvalue overwhelmingly prevails over value. Any 
normative theory that directly considers sentient beings must recognize strong reasons to 
minimize such disvalue. Here, I will respond to a possible objection to this conclusion: that 
if non-sentient natural entities have intrinsic value, then our axiological evaluation of the 
situation of animals in nature must imply either that helping animals in nature is prohibited 
or that our reasons for helping them are considerably weak.
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1. natural diSvaluE
Natural processes tend to maximize the number of sentient beings that 
come into existence only to suffer intensely and to die soon thereafter. 
This is due to the predominance of the reproductive strategy known as 
r-selection, which consists in producing a large number of offspring per 
 1 This work was done with the support of a scholarship granted by CAPES (Coorde-
nação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior). I want to thank Catia Faria, 
Darlei Dall’Agnol, Eze Paez and Oscar Horta for their helpful comments and corrections 
on previous versions of this paper.
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reproductive cycle – hundreds, thousands or even several millions. On 
average, only one offspring per parent survives until sexual maturity. The 
rest usually dies shortly after birth, generally from starvation or by being 
eaten alive. This reproductive strategy is followed by most animal spe-
cies. This shows that the so-called idyllic view of nature is false (Ng 1995; 
Horta 2010a; Tomasik 2014). The number of animals that suffer this fate 
is much higher than that of those exploited for human purposes (Tomasik 
2014).
The disvalue to sentient beings generated by natural processes – natu-
ral disvalue – vastly outweighs the positive experiences they enjoy. This is 
so due to their low-levels of well-being, regardless whether we consider the 
rate of preference satisfaction or the rate of positive and negative experi-
ences. This is also the case when we consider the distribution of value in 
nature among different individuals at the light of different theories  2. This 
implies that we have strong reasons to help animals in nature, derived from 
the axiological evaluation of their situation. This is so whether we look at 
it from an egalitarian, a prioritarian, a sufficientarian, a negative utilitarian 
and even from a standard utilitarian perspective (Horta 2010a, 79, 80, 86). 
There is, however, a possible objection to this conclusion:
The environmentalist view: if entities such as natural processes, ecosystemic 
relations, ecosystems, biocenoses and species have intrinsic value, then our 
reasons given by such value outweigh the reasons given by the disvalue of the 
situation of animals in nature.
If the environmentalist view is right, then we should not help animals in 
nature who suffer from natural causes. I will call this the environmentalist 
prohibition, hereafter abbreviated as (EP):
(EP) We should not intervene in nature to help non-human animals in need.
In this paper, I will not discuss whether natural entities possess intrinsic 
value. My goal is to show that, even if that were the case, it would not be 
sufficient to support (EP). That is, that we have strong overriding reasons 
to help the animals who suffer and die due to natural processes.
In order to argue for this, in section 2 I will claim that if there are good 
reasons to think that natural entities have intrinsic value, we should adopt 
a hybrid position, i.e., one that also recognizes sentient beings as worthy 
of moral consideration. In section 3, I will classify the different defenses 
 2 For instance, utility, equality, maximin, sufficiency or negative and negative leaning 
views that give priority to the prevention of suffering over the promotion of positive well-
being.
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of (EP) based on their relationship (of independence or dependence, and 
to what degree) with the axiological evaluation of the situation of animals 
in nature. In section 4, I will distinguish between the value of an outcome 
according to a certain respect and the value of an outcome all things con-
sidered, and how this distinction implies that even if natural entities were 
shown to have intrinsic value, that would not be sufficient to support (EP). 
In section 5, I will argue that (EP) would still be unjustified even if natural 
entities had greater weight than other values, in determining the overall 
value of a situation. In section 6 my analysis focuses on the hypothesis 
that the value of natural entities trumps other values. Section 7 addresses 
the objection that adopting an aggregative theory of the overall value of 
outcomes, we should consider that the situation in which wild animals 
suffer from natural harms in the wild is good all things considered, and 
that therefore such a theory justifies (EP). Section 8 discusses the objec-
tion that harms (such as suffering and death) do not have negative value 
when they are caused by natural processes. Section 9 reassesses our reasons 
for helping animals in nature, according to different delimitations of the 
moral community, in light of the conclusions drawn in previous sections. 
Section 10 will serve as conclusion.
2. diffErEnt dElimitationS of thE moral community
Consider the following distinction between direct and indirect duties. A 
duty is direct when it is owed to a member of the moral community for her 
own sake. A duty is indirect when it is owed to an entity not for its own 
sake but for the sake of another entity which is a member of the moral 
community. Now, ponder these different ways of delimiting the moral 
community:
 • Anthropocentrism. Human beings are the only objects of direct duties. 
Non-human sentient beings and non-sentient entities are only objects of 
indirect duties.
 • The sentience view. Sentient beings, regardless of species, are the only 
objects of direct duties. Non-sentient entities can only be objects of indi-
rect duties.
 • The holistic view. Non-sentient wholes such as natural processes, ecosys-
temic relations, ecosystems, biocenoses or species (which of them depend-
ing depends on the theory) are the only objects of direct duties. Individual 
beings are merely objects of indirect duties.
 • The hybrid view. Sentient beings, regardless of species, and non-sentient 
natural entities are objects of direct duties (and are also objects of indirect 
duties). Biocentrism, the view that all living beings are morally consider-
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able, is an example of a hybrid view. All the possible combinations of the 
sentience view, holism and biocentrism will also be hybrid views.  3
If speciesism is unjustified, we must reject the anthropocentric view (for 
arguments against speciesism, see Horta 2010c). This entails that if human 
beings must be considered objects of direct duties then ceteris paribus all 
other sentient beings must be objects of direct duties as well regardless of 
their species. This is crucial for our purposes since environmentalist posi-
tions are often combined with anthropocentric criteria (Callicott 1990; 
Varner 1991). It is sometimes maintained that duties to sentient beings 
are only indirect, except in the case of human beings. In other cases, even 
when non-human sentient beings are recognized as objects of direct duties, 
their interests are given a lower consideration compared to the one given to 
similar (or even less important) interests of humans. These positions must 
be rejected as speciesist too.
It only makes sense to give moral consideration to beings who are capa-
ble of being harmed or benefited. When a being possesses such capacity 
she cannot be indifferent among the various states in which she might be. 
This is because she has the capacity to experience some of such states as 
positive and/or others as negative. That is, this is because that individual is 
sentient.
The main reason why all sentient beings ought to be given direct moral 
consideration is the following. It only makes sense to give moral considera-
tion to beings who are in need of such consideration. Someone needs moral 
consideration when she is capable of being harmed or benefited. For this 
condition to be fulfilled, it is necessary that she is not indifferent among the 
various states in which she might be. For someone not be indifferent in that 
way, she must be able to experience some of such states as positive and/or 
others as negative. That is, that individual must be sentient. It is the nega-
tive value of the harms they suffer and the positive value of the benefits they 
enjoy what actually explains why human beings are to be given direct moral 
consideration. However, that also implies that any sentient being ought to 
be given such direct consideration, regardless of her species  4.
 3 That is: the sentience view combined with holism, the sentience view combined 
with biocentrism, holism combined with biocentrism and the combination of the three 
views together. 
 4 This argument also poses problems for the claim that non-sentient entities are worthy 
of direct moral consideration. The proponent of this thesis has to show one of the following 
things. (1) That non-sentient entities are able to be harmed and/or benefited. That is, that 
not being indifferent among the various states in which an object might be is not a neces-
sary condition for that object to be harmed and/or benefited. (2) That some objects must 
be morally considered even if they are incapable of being harmed and/or benefited. 
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However, if there are reasons to give moral consideration to sentient 
beings, then we must not only reject the anthropocentric view and its 
combination with the holistic view. We must also reject the holistic view 
itself, because it does not consider sentient beings as worthy of direct moral 
consideration. If there are also good reasons for considering non-sentient 
entities worthy of direct moral consideration, then we must adhere to a 
hybrid view.
3. diffErEnt EnvironmEntaliSt dEfEnSES of (Ep)
There are two common ways to defend (EP) whilst accepting the claim that 
non-sentient entities are objects of direct duties:
The environmental prohibition dependent on axiology: non-sentient natural 
entities have intrinsic value, and so the value of an outcome (i.e., how good 
or bad) varies according to whether these natural entities are present or 
absent in it. Thus, we should not alter these entities.
According to this view, our evaluation of the value of the outcomes in 
which natural harms occur may be overall positive, which would thus imply 
that our reasons for helping animals in nature are negligible. This position 
is compatible with both consequentialist and non-consequentialist theories, 
including deontological ones. This is so because although only consequen-
tialist theories derive all reasons for acting on considerations about value, 
non-consequentialist theories may also derive some reasons for acting from 
such considerations.
It is important to distinguish this objection from other positions that 
oppose helping animals in nature solely out of a concern with the risks of 
long-term consequences for sentient beings. The difference is that in this 
version of (EP), how good or bad natural harms are is not determined 
solely by how the well-being of sentient beings is affected.
The environmentalist prohibition independent of axiology: there are obliga-
tions not to alter natural entities that override any obligation or permission 
to help sentient beings, and that are violated if we do provide assistance to 
them. These obligations are independent of the value of the state of affairs in 
which animals suffer natural harms.
This position is only compatible with deontological theories, since it affirms 
the existence of obligations that are not concerned (and, moreover, limit) 
the promotion of the best outcome.
I will briefly address this second version of (EP) in section 9. It must 
be noted now that this second version will be very difficult to accept if 
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the victims of natural harms were human beings. For this reason, this view 
is usually combined with anthropocentric speciesist criteria, which should 
also be rejected. Furthermore, it is important to notice that all the conclu-
sions I will draw regarding the first version apply also to this second one.
In what follows I will discuss the environmentalist prohibition depend-
ent on axiology. I shall argue that even if natural entities have intrinsic 
value, it is false that helping animals that suffer from natural harms always 
makes the outcome worse.
4. thE valuE of outcomES:
 “in a cErtain rESpEct” and “all thingS conSidErEd”
The first version of (EP) confuses, on the one hand, the assessment of 
how good or bad an outcome is, and whether it is better or worse than the 
other(s) in a certain respect, with, on the other, how good or bad it is, and 
whether it is better or worse than the other(s), all things considered (Temkin 
2000, 136, 137; Horta 2010b, 138, 139). Providing reasons to think that 
certain entities, events or circumstances have positive intrinsic value is not 
the same thing as providing reasons to think that, given a set of outcomes, 
necessarily the one in which those entities, events or circumstances occur 
more profusely is better than the others, all things considered. This would 
be so only if either the value of the outcome should be determined solely by 
the value of the presence of those things, or if the value of the presence of 
those things trumps any other value.
Accepting that natural entities have intrinsic value does not mean that, 
given a set of outcomes, the one with the greatest amount of non-sentient 
natural entities is necessarily the best one, all things considered. What this 
means is that that outcome is the best in a certain respect, that is, the one 
concerning the value of non-sentient natural entities. Denying this implies 
either holding a monistic axiology (Temkin 2000, 155) or accepting incom-
mensurability and assuming that one of the values present in an outcome 
can trump all others. In this case, that would occur if one considered that 
non-sentient natural entities do not only have intrinsic value, but that they 
actually have a value that either is the only one that exists (thus ruling out 
the hybrid view) or that trumps any other existing value.
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5. what if thE valuE of natural EntitiES
 haS a grEatEr wEight in dEtErmining thE valuE
 of an outcomE?
Let us now assume, for the sake of the argument, that not only non-sentient 
natural entities have intrinsic value, but that it is much weightier than any 
other value. This is actually to concede too much, given that almost no one 
accepts this thesis when humans are harmed by natural processes. My goal 
is to show that, even accepting this it still proves to be insufficient to sup-
port (EP).
Let us first investigate the possibility that the value of non-sentient 
natural entities does not trump other values, but that instead it is weight-
ier (even much weightier). Yet, even on this assumption, there are pos-
sible situations in which the value of non-sentient natural entities is lower 
but that, given the increase in the other values, the situation is, all things 
considered, better than another one in which the value of non-sentient 
natural entities is higher, but there is a considerable decrease in other 
values.
This is so because when we say that a value is weightier (even much 
weightier) than others in determining the value of a situation, but not 
enough to be a trump, we have to admit that there is a point where 
increases in the degree of other values make that situation better than 
others all things considered, even if it represents a decrease in the much 
weightier value. How great the increase in the amount of the other values 
must be and how small the reduction in the amount of the main value must 
be will depend on how important this core value is. At some point, this 
trade-off must be admitted. Otherwise, it would be to assert that such value 
is a trump over others. Therefore, even if the value of non-sentient natu-
ral entities in a situation is much weightier than the well-being of sentient 
beings it would still not be enough to support (EP).
6. what if thE valuE of non-SEntiEnt natural EntitiES
 iS a trump in dEtErmining thE valuE of an outcomE?
Suppose that non-sentient natural entities have intrinsic value, and that 
their value trumps other values (at least, values that concern the good of 
sentient beings). This is again to concede too much. When victims of natu-
ral processes belong to the human species, almost no one assigns a greater 
weight to the value of non-sentient natural entities in determining how 
good or bad the outcome is, much less the function of a trump.
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Table 1. – Trump value and outcomes.
Situation S1 S2 S3
Non-sentient natural entities +10 +9 +10
Well-being of sentient beings -50 +9 +10
But even if that were the case, (EP) would still not be justified. This is so 
because we could think of ways to minimize the disvalue in the situation 
of animals in nature (suffering, premature death, inequality, etc.) without 
necessarily reducing the alleged value of the existence of non-sentient 
natural entities (e.g. we could try to do it without diminishing the degree 
of biodiversity or without disrupting ecosystems or extinguishing species). 
Thus, consider the following situations (see tab. 1), where N is the degree 
of non-sentient natural entities in a situation and S the degree of all that has 
value related to sentient beings (either in terms of individual well-being, 
or in terms of the value of a situation in which various sentient beings are 
present).
If the value of non-sentient natural entities is a trump, we have to con-
clude that S1 is, all things considered, better than S2 (although S2 is much 
better from the standpoint of the well-being of sentient beings). However, 
this would suffice to support (EP) only if it were impossible to help wild 
animals without reducing the level of non-sentient natural entities, which 
have alleged intrinsic value. Such a theory would have to admit that S3 is 
the best of the three situations above.
A possible objection to the previous conclusion is the following: any 
help given to a victim of a natural process prevents a certain natural process 
from taking place, and therefore decreases the amount of natural processes 
present in a situation. Thus, the belief that the value of a certain natural 
entity is a trump does not justify (EP) if the bearers of value are ecosystems, 
biodiversity, or species. This is because preventing a natural process from 
taking place does not necessarily imply a loss of value. However, if what we 
value above all is any natural process, then EP is justified.
Even though this is true, it seems to have absurd implications, which 
are easily noticeable for most of us if we imagine that the victims of natural 
processes are humans. For example, one would have to say that, of two sit-
uations, the one where the number of people contracting cancer and other 
natural diseases or deformities is greater (i.e., the situation where the value 
of natural processes is maximized) is better, all things considered, than the 
one where everyone is healthy. The vast majority of us would not think that 
the situation where everyone has cancer is better even in some respect than 
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the situation where all individuals are in good health – much less that it is 
better, all things considered. When humans are the victims, almost nobody 
believes that harmful natural processes have intrinsic value, much less that 
it trumps any other value. This seems to explain why it is usually argued 
not that natural processes have intrinsic value, but that other non-sentient 
natural entities (biodiversity, ecosystems, species, etc.) have it instead. In 
the few instances where the intrinsic value of natural processes is defended, 
this defense is combined with anthropocentric speciesist criteria. For this 
same reason, such position should be rejected.
7. thE objEction that thE valuE of an outcomE
 Should bE dEtErminEd SolEly by thE total Sum
 of Each valuE
Another possible defense of (EP) would be: “although there are distinct 
factors, each with independent intrinsic value, the value of an outcome, all 
things considered, should be determined solely by the total sum of all that 
has value minus the sum of all that has disvalue”. The objection could then 
proceed: “the situation where animals endure natural harms in nature has 
positive value, all things considered, because the high prevalence of disvalue 
for sentient beings is somehow compensated by the high amount of non-
sentient natural entities in the situation”.
This axiology would be an aggregationist one similar to the one utili-
tarianism endorses, though instead of valuing the total sum of what has 
value to sentient beings, it would also add to it other values given by the 
existence of non-sentient natural entities (see tab. 2). I will call this the 
Aggregative Hybrid Axiology (abbreviated as AHA).
According to AHA, S5 is, all things considered, better than S4 (even 
though S4 is better in respect to the well-being of sentient beings) because 
in S5 the sum is greater (not necessarily because in it the presence of non-
sentient natural entities is greater).
Table 2. – Aggregative Hybrid Axiology (AHA).
Situation S4 S5
Non-sentient natural entities +1 +112
Well-being of sentient beings +10 -100
Total sum +11 +12
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This objection does not justify (EP). This is so regardless of whether 
an aggregative axiology of this type is plausible. It would also be the case 
independently of of whether there really is a higher amount of non-sentient 
natural entities than disvalue for sentient beings in nature. It does not 
depend either on whether it is possible to commensurate these values. 
According to such an axiology, if the value an outcome has is in one 
aspect significant enough, it can compensate a similarly significant dis-
value which that outcome may have in another respect. Nevertheless, it is 
important to notice that there are two possible ways, given that axiology, to 
improve a situation: by increasing what has value or by decreasing what has 
disvalue. Either way, we will be increasing the total sum. So, let us consider 
again S5, where there is a large amount of non-sentient natural entities and 
sentient beings have a very low level of well-being. Let us assume that this 
represents the situation of animals in nature. There are two ways how we 
can improve it, given this aggregative axiology (see tab. 3).
One way is to bring about S6: this would increase the amount of the 
already prevalent value (in this case, we increase the level of non-sentient 
natural entities). Another way is to bring about S7: here, we improve the 
situation in the same proportion by increasing the non-prevalent value (in 
this case, we reduce the disvalue suffered by sentient beings), even if it 
implies decreasing the other value.
This axiology could not say that S6 is better than S7. To decrease what 
is of disvalue in a situation is also a way to increase its total sum. Moreover, 
a normative account based on such axiology would have to say that if we 
face the choice between S6 and S7, it is morally optional whether to choose 
one or the other. Hence, those who want to decrease the disvalue that sen-
tient beings suffer caused by natural processes would be allowed to do so. 
Therefore, this objection cannot support (EP). 
Table 3. – Aggregative Hybrid Axiology (AHA) 
and improvement.
Situation S5 S6 S7
Non-sentient natural entities +112 +162 +112
Well-being of sentient beings -100 -100 -50
Total sum +12 +62 +62
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8. thE objEction that thE harm inflictEd
 to SEntiEnt bEingS doES not havE nEgativE valuE
 whEn cauSEd by natural procESSES
A final objection claims that it would be a mistake to attach negative value 
to the harms suffered by sentient beings when they are caused by natural 
processes. According to this objection, there would be nothing negative 
about the situation of animals in nature, since it assumes that a harm can 
only have negative value when it is the result of moral agency.
One possible reply to this view is that it makes very difficult to explain 
what is it about moral agency that imbues harms with negative value. 
Consider, for instance, suffering. If we had to explain why the suffering 
caused by moral agents contributes to the negative value of an outcome, 
there seems to be no plausible way to do it but to appeal to the intrinsic 
characteristics of suffering itself, which are essentially evaluative: it is the 
kind of experience always perceived as negative by those who experience it. 
This makes it something of which the experiencer wants to avoid. A crucial 
point to note here is that all this explanation makes no reference to the 
origin of suffering. The fact that suffering is an intrinsically bad experience 
does not change according to its origin. An instance of suffering caused by 
some natural process is not less bad than it would have been if it had been 
caused by a moral agent. The same reasoning would apply (albeit with dif-
ferent explanations) to other types of harms.
9. rEaSSESSing our rEaSonS for hElping animalS in naturE 
 according to thE diffErEnt dElimitationS
 of thE moral community
If we hold the sentience view it seems clear that we will claim that in nature 
disvalue vastly outweighs value. This will be so because of the enormous 
amount of suffering and premature death that exists in it and the compara-
tively existent small amount of well-being. However, if we hold instead 
a hybrid view, we will still have to claim that the situation of animals in 
nature is very bad because of the disvalue they suffer, even though we 
may still maintain that there are other valuable things in nature apart from 
wellbeing, that is, the presence of certain non-sentient entities. Thus, even 
if non-sentient natural entities possess positive intrinsic value, it is also 
true that these entities have significant negative instrumental value, since 
they produce in abundance things of negative intrinsic value for sentient 
beings.
Luciano Carlos Cunha
62
Relations – 3.1 - June 2015
http://www.ledonline.it/Relations/
Moreover, if we really care about sentient beings, we will try help them 
so as to maximize their well-being. A situation is better than any other, all 
things considered, if each element in it which has intrinsic value is present 
to a higher degree than in all the others. That is what is expected from a 
delimitation of the moral community that recognizes direct duties to sen-
tient beings, regardless of whether it recognizes (and its degree of recogni-
tion) intrinsic value to non-sentient natural entities.
Nevertheless, suppose that (EP) was defended on the grounds that 
direct duties to non-sentient natural entities are stronger than the obliga-
tion (or permission) to bring about the best possible outcome (the envi-
ronmentalist prohibition regardless of axiology). As said above, this is only 
compatible with some deontological theories. In addition, as we have seen, 
this appears to be an anthropocentric speciesist view, given that most of us 
would hardly accept its implications in those cases in which humans are 
the victims of natural processes. In addition, the most important point is 
that the previous conclusions regarding (EP) dependent on axiology also 
apply also to (EP) regardless of axiology. Analogously to what was dis-
cussed in terms of value, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) giving 
reasons for thinking that non-sentient entities are objects of direct duties 
(regardless of their value) would not determine that this duty is absolute, 
or even stronger than the duty to (or the permission to) help sentient 
beings; (2) even if the duty in question was stronger, or even absolute, it is 
possible to search for ways to help animals in nature that do not conflict 
with it.
10. concluSion
The analysis of the arguments above leads us to conclude that if sentient 
beings should be the objects of direct duties, as it seems to be the case, 
no axiological consideration may justify the environmentalist prohibition 
(EP). This is so even if we adopt an axiology that attributes intrinsic value 
to non-sentient natural entities, and regardless of the weight that the value 
of these non-sentient natural entities has in determining the value of the 
situation as a whole. According to some theories, the value of the situation 
of animals in nature would increase if certain non-sentient natural entities 
were present. However that might be, such a situation would also be highly 
disvaluable in another respect: the one concerning the well-being of sen-
tient individuals (either in terms of their low levels of well-being or in terms 
of the distribution of well-being among sentient beings). That is exactly 
what makes it urgent to improve the situation of animals in nature.
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This does not imply that whether we adopt the sentience view or the 
hybrid view of the moral community, our judgment of the reasons for acting 
with respect to the situation of animals in nature will necessarily be the same. 
It will probably be very different. According to the sentience view, when 
helping animals in nature our only concern is their well-being. Accord-
ing to the hybrid view, considerations about non-sentient natural entities 
could somehow limit our help. This shows that the debate over whether 
non-sentient natural entities should be the object of direct duties remains 
extremely relevant. Axiological considerations that take into account the 
intrinsic value of non-sentient natural entities are not sufficient to support 
(EP) nor to weaken our reasons to reduce disvalue in the situation of ani-
mals in nature (although it could somehow limit these interventions). The 
claim that non-sentient natural entities have intrinsic value does not pose, 
as it might have been initially thought, a significant threat to the conclusion 
that we should aid those animals in nature who are victims of natural harms.
All this drives us to the conclusion that it is justified to help animals 
in nature. In this paper I have left open the question of whether it is also 
a duty to do so. However, given the magnitude of disvalue in the wild, it 
seems that if humans were the victims, we would promptly recognize that 
looking for ways to reduce that disvalue would not only be a duty, but a 
very stringent one.
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